Showing posts with label microeconomics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label microeconomics. Show all posts

Friday, December 12, 2008

Car bubble

Yet another failed attempt to pass the rescue package for US automakers. How long before they try again? February? (Aside: Will GM's, Ford's, Chrysler's CEOs now bring their private jets to fly back home to spite the Senate?)

Here's one I haven't heard before (though maybe that's because I haven't been able to follow the blogosphere that much lately):

  1. Over the years, we had been hearing that US automakers were not making a good return (to say the least) on their auto-making side, but were making some profit on the financial side. This is taken today to mean that consumers didn't really want the cars they made if it wasn't for their very convenient, easily obtained financing. (Remember all those "0% financing" ads?)
  2. Now we are all painfully aware that credit was so preposterously cheap in the last many years thanks to (lay-the-blame-where-you-will) set of circumstances which led to the non-pricing of risk.
  3. So was the strategy US automakers used to survive this far just another side-show in the (market-failure induced) Cheap Credit main attraction?

(Keep in mind that "US cars" are, controlling for characteristics, already cheaper than "foreign" ones; and that more-expensive labor, for all it's blamed, has but a small effect on the final price of a car; see here, for example.)

In other words, now that the credit bubble popped, is there really a place left under the wintry sun for all three of GM, Chrysler, and Ford?

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Thursday, March 20, 2008

Saving in employer's stocks

Megan McArdle blogs:

* One-third of employees eligible to invest in company stock through their 401(k) have more than 20% in their company's stock.

* Almost 9% of them have more than 80% invested in their employer.

* For employees in their 60s, almost 20% hold half of their 401(k) savings in company stock.

(This, in regard to a report that Bear Stearns' employees' 401(k) plans were heavily invested in the company's stock. The thread of comments then discusses whether BS offered or did not offer stock-purchase options in their 401k's (it seems they did not, but had an ESOP for it).)


Should I feel sorry for Enron/Bear employees who put 20 or 80 percent of their pensions on Enron/Bear shares? There was plenty of advice out there to NOT do that. I certainly don't feel sorry for traders/analysts/executives etc who did it: they are financially savvy. Perhaps some employees who are not expected to have known better? OK, I feel sorry for that hypothetical lot.


Thaler and Goolsbee must be having a melancholy-tinged chuckle. Is this more evidence that we're all irrational (or so bad at dealing with risk or so prone to mistaken beliefs) that we need to be protected from our own failed instincts? (Like whether to have the option to sign in or to sign out of 401k's to start with.)


(And please, let's not get started with the argument that employees have better info that non-employees and so their decision is rational. To start with, ESOPs don't work that way: they cannot let employees react to privileged info quickly as it would smack of insider trading; by the time they can do something, the market already has the info (for example, you announce your intent to buy at the beginning of a quarter and the purchase is done at the end of it). What really matters are the incentives given to the purchase (matching purchases, discounts on the price, choosing the lowest price over the following quarter, etc). Also, a case could be made that there is an illusion of having "better information" that will allow you to beat the market after controlling for the special incentives and that the apparent irrationality stems from that, from mistaken believes.)


Hmm. If some smart behavioral econ can show that people do have an irrational tendency to over-invest in their employer's stock (which my experience in companies that offer ESOPs suggests is the case), does this mean a cap should be placed on how much of one's retirement savings can be in the current employer's stock?


Since my knee-jerk, libertarian reaction is to say "no" to more regulation, let me make a modest policy proposal that operates through education (indoctrination?):


Some high-school course should work hard at driving-in a three-step lesson:

  1. Out of each paycheck, first deal with expenditure needs; then with long-term savings; and only then, if you want to gamble, allocate a percentage of the remaining income to it. Stick to that percentage as an iron-clad max (and never as a min!).
  2. Dealing in individual shares is gambling, no matter what, period.

  3. Corollary: if your employer offers stock-purchase incentives, that is nothing but subsidized gambling. Allocate accordingly, given the shift in relative returns. But do so out of gambling money.

  4. 401k = LONG term savings = BROAD index funds, where you can park the money and forget about it until retirement starts getting close.

Then victims of ESOPs-gone-bad cannot claim to not have known better. And we don't need to feel guilty about their despair. Which will avoid creating perverse incentives through the political process.

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Monday, March 3, 2008

What took you so long? Mismatched incentives and price-less risk

From the FT this morning:


“It seems that equities are finally becoming aware that all other asset classes are in risk aversion mode,” analysts at BNP Paribas said. “They are also recognizing that the prospects for profit growth in the near term could be constrained, given the procession of economic data highlighting the fragile state of the US economy.”


Analysts get paid to stay informed, process the information efficiently, and act accordingly. So it's amazing, ain't it, what they come to find only at the start of March? At least they didn't wait for the ides.


One can no longer be surprised by the capacity of analysts/traders/fund managers to cover the totally obvious through a mystical invocation of a new set of laws for the Universe of Vanishing Risk. Housing bubble, dot-com boom, this time, at least, we're being spared the justifications: US stocks had simply been doing quite well since January relative to other domestic and foreign assets in the face of worsening domestic econ news (even housing stocks have had their rally). If anything, I would venture it's the conviction that bad news are merely triggers for the Fed to shoot down rates further so the party can go on.


The magic spell of the moment is really irrelevant: it will happen again, we will recover and then, a few years from now, the experts will claim they've again discovered a new universe beyond the laws of economics ("this time it's for real!"), will forget to account for risk, and will try to pull us along with them. The irony is that we know it will happen precisely because it's all laid out there by those very same laws of microeconomics, most basic of all: people react to incentives.


What we ought to do is look at what the incentives facing analysts, traders, and fund managers (specially hedge fund managers) are. And the constant has been, as far back as we care to go to understand today's financial architecture, that these incentives are skewed towards short-term horizons and divorced from the downside-risk the agents' actions generate. The results are rewards virtually unlimited on the upside and limited on the downside to, in the worst case scenario, temporary unemployment (has anyone tracked the career paths of hedge fund managers whose portfolios tanked?).


To go back to my leitmotif: a lot of the risk gets priced close to zero because the agents making the calls are essentially not facing it.


With that in mind, there's no mystery left to explain: it's not stupidity and there certainly is nothing irrational (nor evil) at play; it's plain self-interest on the parts of both these market-movers as well as the institutions who hire them, at the expense of clients with (rationally?) limited information (who are also acting on their info-constrained best interest).


(In a darker angle: Kerviel's defense in the SocGen scandal boils down to "SocGen knew what I was doing and didn't care as long as I was making money for them.")


So if it's all about self interest, should we care? Isn't it what markets are all about? My pet peeve here is the considerable negative externality (and the perverted incentives) exerted on others by these actions when they find fertile ground in enough actors on the other side of the fence to tilt the markets. Those who do get informed and "do the right thing" (in this case, those on both sides of the market who follow the path given by fundamentals up to the existence of a bubble) not only miss the unsustainable gains on the upswing, but even worse, when things inevitably come crashing down, end up suffering the adjustment just like those who played hard'n'reckless, and worst of all, have to bail out those who bet and lost.


But no, the point here is not that the government should step in and regulate the life out of markets: please, I'm an economist! Indeed, I think federal and state governments have contributed to the mess in the housing market through their tax incentives in favor of house ownership (or, rephrasing this, against renting). And I really don't see how the government could improve on the reasons causing the market to fail to self-regulate.


On the contrary, it is conceivable that the mismatches in the planning horizons and allocation of risk could be eliminated so that private contracts and compensation schemes would suffice to produce better results.


For this to happen, stakeholders in the financial markets need to find a way to overcome their collective action issues and design better incentives for themselves, by which I mean more closely aligning their corporate interests and that of its market-informing/moving employees with those of the clients they inform and for whom they act as agents. In particular, this means incorporating into compensation schemes a sense of the risk, both on the upside and the downside, that their employees' decisions generate on clients' returns, and to extend the horizon of this effect on compensation over a few years.


In fact, both things work together nicely: smoothing earnings over a longer period provides incentives to think in terms of risk over the longer-term while allowing compensation to be based on realized risk, including a bigger downside. On average, agents' compensation would better track their record.


Easier said than done: the coordination problem starts when investment banks, hedge funds, etc. grow afraid they will chase talent away if they move away from immediate, limited-liability returns in favor of time-smoothed contracts that load more risk. It grows deeper when imperfectly informed clients believe the illusion of risk-less returns coming out from the "experts" and demand such returns. More generally, there are too many stakeholders (on both sides, but so many more on the clients' side) for transaction costs to allow spontaneous Coasian bargaining to get to the efficient result.


So yes, perhaps some (public) institution might be needed to provide a forum that allows this coordination to take place in. Not to blurt out even more complex regulations that will inevitably be ran loops around, but to help the parties involved overcome the costs of re-starting the system from a more efficient equilibrium. Unfortunately, the financial markets have consistently proven their inability to stop these "misalignments" (I won't call them all bubbles) from happening over and over again on their own.


Otherwise, the rational thing will be for all of us to play dumb and go for broke every few years when markets spin out of control because of some screwed up incentives scheme. Not a good equilibrium.

CLICK to go on reading "What took you so long? Mismatched incentives and price-less risk"

Thursday, February 28, 2008

Civil disobedience

Arnold Kling writes:


The idea of civil disobedience is that it allows a minority to confront a situation that the majority of people are passively tolerating. It allows the minority to show intensity of feelings, and it forces others in society to look at the issue and choose sides... Another way to think of it is that there are multiple equilibria in politics, and in social norms in general... And maybe the only way to [change the] equilibrium is through civil disobedience.

The way I see it, the issue behind civil disobedience is one of the transaction costs needed to coordinate the actions of a group who already agrees with an idea (or perhaps is willing to agree with it if exposed to it). It has little to do with changing the opinion of the majority (in fact, that group could already be the majority itself). Good ol' Coase, good ol' collective action.


Let me explain: let's say that

  1. Change requires a simple majority (we will lift this assumption later).
  2. There is a minority with a true "better idea:" a blueprint for an alternative set of institutions that leads to a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.
  3. This minority is failing to convince enough of the electorate to demand a new course through the existing mechanisms.

The problem could be that: (a) the majority is not interested in paying the cost to become informed, but would agree if informed; or (b) is informed and agrees, but fails to act because of the usual issues of collective action augmented by ignorance with respect to the size of the group (even if we all acted, would it be enough to generate change?); or (c) would disagree if informed or is informed and disagrees.


If the problem is (c), then no amount of civil disobedience would lead to much. Perhaps the majority is truly irrational (a la Caplan's "Myth of the Irrational Voter") or perhaps they are rational but mistrust the new institutions to (re)distribute the Kaldor-Hicks welfare improvement in a way that benefits them (could that be called "a constrained Pareto improvement"?). This is precisely the case in which the majority approves of state repression of those violating the rules. If their minds can be changed, it's not likely to be through civil disobedience. End of story. (We do it too: nobody thinks that every thief is a Robin Hood.)


But if the problem is either (a) or (b), it is then equivalent to one in which a majority already exists, albeit one suffering from transaction costs that are too high either at the information stage or, being informed, in overcoming the usual barriers to collective action/public good provision. I would further argue that (a) is really caused by (b): why would an agent choose to remain ignorant if not because he or she cannot see a positive return to acquiring the information? So I will concentrate on (b).


And in this situation, civil disobedience is one of the many alternatives used to overcome collective action issues, much like talk radio or grassroots movements.


Say a small group with a low activation threshold protests and gets arrested; if their case makes it to the evening news and is seen by a larger group with a higher activation threshold, this might be enough to signal to them the existence of others and to inform them of coordination mechanisms (like a march on Saturday to show support for those arrested). From then on, the meme can spread through coverage of each successive (and larger scale) act, and so activate other agents with even higher thresholds as two things happen: information about the size of the group is revealed (as long as it is revealed to be large enough to show that a cost-benefit analysis of taking action can be passed in the positive); and coordinating action becomes less costly through the spread of high-profile information about what, where, and when to do.


Here, we can lift the assumption of a simple majority to enact change: large enough minorities can exert sufficient pressure on legislators when they are better coordinated than the majority, as any lobbyist worth his/her salt knows.


This poor-researcher's model might be enough to suggest when civil disobedience is more likely to be effective as a mechanism for social change. There needs to be a group large enough to enact change, but ignorant of its own size and facing informational costs that make coordination mechanisms too expensive. There can either be heterogeneity within this group with respect to the activation thresholds, all the way down to some individuals willing to pay a really high cost to see change enacted; or some random shock on an agent's environment that leads this one to act first. Finally, there must be a medium which allows information to spread cheaply once someone gets the ball rolling.


Two things are missing from this model: first, details about the characteristics of the medium and the message. Let me go out on a stereotyping limb for a second. Blogs are cheap to consume and can spread quickly, but they transmit information with a (relative) low emotional quotient as it must be read and thus relies on a (relatively) higher appeal to reason compared to emotion. The evening TV news are also cheap to consume and can also spread quickly, but they are transmitted through moving images of the real world. This allows them to appeal more directly to emotion and rely less on reason. And on top of all, there are the selection issues involved in who relies more on blogs and who more on evening TV news. Through which mechanism is civil disobedience more likely spread at an early stage, at an intermediate stage, at a late stage? I would place my intrade.com bet on blogs triggering the pioneers into action and then TV kicks in to spread the call to action massively.


The other missing element is, of course, something to set the whole thing in motion. Again, I'm totally guessing, but I venture two triggers. In one scenario, there are low-activation threshold agents acting all the time, but the technology is not there to spread the news about it to inform the troops it's time to rally. Along comes a technological shock such the printing press, radio, TV, or the Internet that makes this cost-effective. (The exogenous shock could be something subtler, like a change in the news market that makes it more likely that this type of stories will be transmitted; for example, a change in ownership rules that make it possible to transmit more local news.)


In the other scenario, ideas and rhetoric become important again: the low-activation threshold agents are those who have lower costs in acquiring information (or in being swayed by it). Along come the intellectuals or the marketers as an exogenous shock that sets the whole thing in motion.


It is in this sense only that civil disobedience can disguise itself as a way to change the social consensus; but I would still argue that it does no such thing as it needs an audience receptive to the message, just waiting for enough of a spark (from the low-action threshold agents) to show to the its own self that it is out there and that it is large enough to merit action.


Hmmm... maybe I should write a paper... But no, I can't: I must go and file my taxes like a responsible, law-abiding patsy.

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